The possible exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union will have profound economic and political effects. Here we look at a particular aspect, the power distribution in the Council of the European Union. Since the Lisbon treaty the exit does not require new negotiations as the success of a voting initiative only depends on the number and total population of the supporting member states. Using the Shapley-Shubik power index we calculate the member states' powers with and without the United Kingdom and update earlier power forecasts using the Eurostat's latest population projections. There is a remarkably sharp relation between population size and the change in power: Brexit increases the largest members', while decreases the smallest ones' powers.
Introduction
Britain's relation to the European Union has never been simple. Britain was initially not interested in joining the European Economic Community. When it changed its mind its membership request was vetoed by France twice. It nally joined only in 1973, but even since the relation has been complicated.
The Brexit the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union has been on the agenda ever since it joined in 1973. In 2013, however, David Cameron Conservative prime minister committed to hold a referendum after his reelection: The referendum is scheduled for 23 June 2016. Britain would not be the rst departure from the European Union, since Greenland has left in 1985 over disagreements in shing rights, but it would be the rst sovereign country and its departure would have widespread eects on life and economy both in the UK and in Europe (Buckle et al., 2015; Dagnis Jensen and Snaith, 2016; Oliver, 2016) . Our goal is not to provide a comprehensive review of such likely eects: we look at the consequences of the Brexit on the voting in the European Council, better known by its former name, the This short note then has two parts. After introducing the power index method rstly we update the power predictions using the more recent data from Eurostat and then recalculate these with a 27 member EU in mind.
Preliminaries
Voting situations can be modelled by simple games: cooperative games with transferable utility where winning coalitions get a payo 1, losing coalitions get 0. We are interested in power, that is, the ability to change decisions. In this paper we are particulary interested in power indices that show the individual voters' share of decisions. Such indices show that if a decision is made, what is the probability that a particular player was instrumental in making this decision. Translate this into politics and voting about the spending of a budget and the index shows the probability that the spending of a euro (or a billion) was according to the interests of this particular player. While the model is clearly a simplication, a power index shows the percentual shares of a given budget that the individual voters spend according to their interests. 
where s = |S|.
There are many alternatives to the Shapley-Shubik index; the PenroseBanzhaf measure and index is the most commonly used one, but recently the nucleolus has also been considered for measuring power; in fact Zaporozhets et al. (2016) nd that if power and needs both determine the allocation of a budget, the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969; Montero, 2013) though very dicult to compute is, theoretically a better alternative.
Data and results
Voting in the European Council solely depends on population numbers. We have used data from Eurostat (2014) for current populations and for forecasts until 2080. The data are presented in Table 1 . We have used IOP -Indices of Power 2.05 (Bräuninger and König, 2005) to calculate the Shapley-Shubik indices of the countries. First for the current 28-member European Union, then for the 27-member European Union without the United Kingdom.
The changes in power are largely predictable. The Property of New Members (Brams and Auso, 1976; Kóczy, 2009) Do they benet? What we have seen here is that the conditional probability that if a decision is made, it is a particular player who made the decision is increased for most players. On the other hand we must also be aware of the fact that the United Kingdom, despite many concessions it was able to obtain, remains a net contributor to the budget of the European Union. The
Brexit therefore does not only mean that this abstract conditional probability changes, but also that the cake to share becomes smaller. So if we want to translate power to euros, a fair comparison should account for the smaller cake, too. About 8.822% of the budget of the European Union is paid by the United Kingdom (European Parliament, 2015) and even if we subtract the benets it gets from various EU programmes, the EU budget and hence the monetary benets must be scaled down by 96.61%. The adjusted indices are presented in Table 4 .
With this adjustment many more countries lose by the Brexit. Countries with a population below 6 million, lose up to 10% of the original resources, While it is a little dicult to study comparative statics with power indices, it is noticeable that all small countries lose power, sometimes more than 15%, the biggest winners are large countries. When the incomplete coalition is of the rst kind, any country will do, when it is of the second, large players are generally more useful. What about small countries? If only an extra member is needed, small countries are useful, but when some population is missing, they are, generally, less interesting.
The United Kingdom is one of the largest members, its departure means that the number of incomplete coalitions due to insucient participations decreases more than of those with insucient populations. This way smaller countries nd themselves useful less often, while the change is less pronounced for large countries. In other terms, the UK is a substitute for large, but a complement for small countries. Due to the normalisation the large countries benet, the small ones suer. We present the power projections in Figure 2 for four regions (similar graphs for individual countries are presented in the appendix).
These four regions are aected dierently by the introduction of the new, Lisbon voting rules, the demographics, and the Brexit. While the core countries may increase their inuence by some 50% compared to the Nizza rules, Nordic countries including Britain and Austria have a steady increase unless, 1 Its widely used alternative is the Banzhaf index. In the Banzhaf index the same players get credit for being critical, but the probability or weight of coalitions is slightly dierent.
The results are qualitatively the same. 
